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 Abstract. Agent Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE) is a software 
paradigm that has grasped the attention of researchers the last few years. As a 
result, many different methods have been introduced to enable developers 
develop multi-agent systems. However, so far, security requirements have been 
mainly neglected, and the common approach towards the inclusion of security 
within a system is to identify security requirements after the definition of the 
system. This approach has provoked the emergence of computer systems 
afflicted with security vulnerabilities. In this paper we propose an analysis, 
based on the measures of criticality (how critical an actor of the system is) and 
complexity (represents the effort required by the actors of the system to achieve 
the requirements that have been imposed to them), which aims to identify 
possible bottlenecks of a multi-agent system with respect to security. An 
integrated agent-based health and social care information system is used as a 
case study throughout this paper. 
1 Introduction 
In a world that becomes more and more reliant on software systems, security is an 
important concern. Private information is stored in computer systems and without 
security, organizations are not willing to share information or even use the 
technology.  In addition, possible security breaches can cost huge amount of time and 
money.  
Following the wide recognition of multi-agent systems, agent-oriented software 
engineering has been introduced as a major field of research. Many agent-oriented 
software engineering methodologies have been proposed [1,2] each one of those 
offering different approaches in modeling multi-agent systems. However, only few 
attempts [3] have been made to integrate security issues within the development 
stages of methodologies. 
Security requirements are generally difficult to analyse and model. It is difficult to 
analyse because many times security requirements conflict with functional 
requirements and many trade offs are required. Performing such trade offs can be 
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painful and time-consuming and it requires software and security engineering 
expertise. In addition, there is lack of developers’ acceptance and expertise for secure 
software development.  
Usually the goal will be to provide as much security as possible trading sometimes 
security concerns with other functional and non-functional requirements. To better 
achieve this goal, agent-oriented software engineering methodologies must help 
developers, through a systematic approach, to determine how complex is for each part 
(actor) of the system to achieve the security requirements, and also identify the most 
critical actors of the system with respect to security. Such an approach will help 
developers to perform trade offs between security and other functional and non-
functional requirements based on quantitative measurements and thus minimizing the 
risks of putting in danger the security of the system. 
Within a multi-agent system, more likely, different agents will play different roles 
and, with respect to security, some will be more critical than others. In addition, some 
agents of the system might have been overloaded (assigned more security 
requirements than they can handle) and thus fail to satisfy some of the security 
requirements assigned to them.  
Developers must be able to identify, through a systematic approach and without 
much security knowledge, such cases and redefine the design of the system in such a 
way that none of the agents of the system are overloaded and all the security 
requirements assigned to the agents of the system are satisfied.  
In this paper we propose an approach based on the concepts of criticality and 
complexity, and we indicate how such a process can be integrated within the early 
requirements analysis stage of the Tropos methodology. This work is within the 
context of the Tropos project [2] and our aim is to provide a clear and well-guided 
process of integrating security and functional requirements throughout the whole 
range of the development process. Section 2 provides an overview of Tropos 
methodology, and also introduces the electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) 
system case study. In Section 3, we describe the process of analysing the complexity 
and criticality of a system with respect to security, and we present an algorithm to 
reduce the complexity and/or the criticality of the “overloaded” actors.  Finally, 
Section 4 presents some concluding remarks and directions for future work. 
2 Tropos Methodology 
Before we can describe our approach, we think it is necessary to provide an 
overview of Tropos methodology and how security can be integrated to it.  Tropos is 
an agent oriented software engineering methodology, tailored to describe both the 
organisational environment of a system and the system itself, employing the same 
concepts throughout the development stages. The Tropos methodology is intended to 
support all the analysis and design activities in the software development process, 
from the application domain analysis down to the system implementation [2]. Using 
Tropos, developers build a model of the system-to-be and its environment that is 
incrementally refined.  
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Tropos adopts Yu’s i* model [4] which offers the concepts of actors, goals, tasks, 
resources and social dependencies for defining the obligations of actors (dependees) 
to other actors (dependers). Actors have strategic goals and intentions within the 
system or the organisation and represent (social) agents (organisational, human or 
software), roles or positions (represent a set of roles). A goal represents the strategic 
interests of an actor. In Tropos we differentiate between hard goals (only goals 
hereafter) and soft goals; the latter having no clear definition or criteria for deciding 
whether they are satisfied or not. A task represents a way of doing something. For 
example a task can be executed in order to satisfy a goal. A resource represents a 
physical or an informational entity while a dependency between two actors indicates 
that one actor depends on another to accomplish a goal, execute a task, or deliver a 
resource. 
Tropos covers four stages of software development: Early Requirements analysis 
consists of identifying and analysing the stakeholders and their intentions. 
Stakeholders are modeled as social actors, while their intentions are modeled as goals 
that, through a goal-oriented analysis, are decomposed into finer goals, which 
eventually can support evaluation of alternatives. Late Requirements analysis 
consists of analysing the system-to-be within its operating environment, along with 
relevant functions and qualities. The system is introduced as an actor and the 
dependencies between the system and the other actors of the organization are 
explicitly modeled. These dependencies define the system’s requirements. 
Architectural Design describes the system’s global architecture in terms of 
subsystems (actors) interconnected through data and control flows (dependencies). 
During this stage, new actors are introduced in the system as a result of analysis 
performed at different levels of abstraction. In addition, capabilities needed by the 
actors to fulfill their goals and tasks are identified. Detailed Design deals with the 
specification of each architectural component in terms of inputs, outputs, control and 
other relevant information. Tropos faces the detailed design stage on the basis of the 
specifications resulting from the architectural design stage and the reasons for a given 
element can be traced back to the early requirements analysis.   
The security process in Tropos consists of analyzing the security needs of the 
stakeholders and the system in terms of security constraints [5] imposed to the 
stakeholders (early requirements) and the system (late requirements), identifying 
secure entities [5] that guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints, and 
assigning capabilities to the system (architectural design) to help towards the 
satisfaction of the secure entities.  
In our work [3, 5] we define security constraints as constraints that are related to 
the security of the system whereas secure entities represent any secure 
goal/task/resource of the system [5]. Security constraints can be categorized into 
Positive –they influence the security of the system positively (e.g., Allow Access only 
to Personal Information) – or negative – they influence the security of the system 
negatively (e.g., Send information plain text).  
   To make the process easier to understand, we consider as an example the 
electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) case study first introduced by 
Mouratidis et. al [6]. The eSAP case study involves the development of an agent-
based health and social care system for the effective care of older people. Security in 
such a system, as in any health and social care information system, is very important 
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since revealing a medical history could have serious consequences for particular 
individuals. Taking into account a substantial part of the eSAP, we have defined the 
following stakeholders for our case study: The Older Person (OP) actor is the older 
person (patient) that wishes to receive appropriate health and social care. The 
Professional actor represents health and/or social care professionals involved in the 
care of the Older Person.  The DoH actor represents the English Department of 
Health, which is responsible for the effective care of the Older Person. The Benefits 
Agency actor is an agency that helps the Older Person financially, and the R&D 
Agency represents a research and development agency interested in obtaining medical 
information.  
During the early requirements analysis stage, the dependencies, the goals and the 
security constraints between these actors can be modeled using Tropos actors’ 
diagram as shown in Figure 11. In such a diagram each node represents an actor, and 
the links between the different actors indicate that one depends on another to 





Fig. 1. The actor diagram of the eSAP system 
In our example, the Older Person depends on the Benefits Agency to Receive 
Financial Support. However, the Older Person worries about the privacy of their 
                                                          
1 The numbers next to the security constraints represent the criticality of the constraint (Section 
3). 
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finances so they impose a constraint to the Benefits Agency actor, to keep their 
financial information private. The Professional depends on the Older Person to 
Obtain Information, however one of the most important and delicate matters for a 
patient (in our case the Older Person) is the privacy of their personal medical 
information, and the sharing of it. Thus most of the times the Professional is imposed 
a constraint to share this information if and only if consent is achieved.  One of the 
main goals of the R&D Agency is to Obtain Clinical Information in order to perform 
tests and research. To get this information the R&D Agency depends on the 
Professional. However, the Professional actor is imposed a constraint (by the 
Department of Health) to Keep Patient Anonymity. 
3 Criticality and Complexity 
In the previous section we have briefly described a process of analysing the security 
of an organisational setting taking into consideration some security constraints, which 
are imposed by the different stakeholders. However, more likely different security 
constraints are having different impact on the security of the system. That is, one 
constraint might put in danger the security of the system in a level that must be 
satisfied even if it involves a trade off with some other functional or non-functional 
requirements, whereas other constraints might not be as important. As a result, 
different actors of the system impact the security of the system differently according 
to what security constraints have been imposed to. Thus, it is important to provide an 
analysis that identifies the impact each actor has on the security of the system. In 
doing so we need to define how critical each security constraint is for the overall 
security of the system. We call this measure, security criticality2 and we define it as 
follows:  
 
Security Criticality is the measure of how the security of the system will be 
affected if the security constraint is not achieved.   
 
Security criticality allows us to evaluate how critical each actor of the system is 
with respect to security. This will help us to identify the security bottlenecks of the 
system, and refine it by taking into consideration the different impact that each actor 
has on the security of the system. We differentiate between ingoing and outgoing 
security criticality. Ingoing security criticality is the security criticality that actors 
assume when they are responsible for achieving a security constraint. On the other 
hand, the outgoing security criticality represents the security criticality of the 
achievement of a constraint for the imposer. 
In order to calculate the criticality of the system, we consider the dependencies and 
we assign a value for each security constraint (see numbers next to security 
constraints in Figure 1). These values were assigned after closely studying the 
system’s environment and after discussing them with the stakeholders. In the case of 
an open secure dependency (a dependency that has no security constraints attached to 
it), we assign a value of zero both for the ingoing and outgoing criticalities.   
                                                          
2 Criticality has been introduced by E. Yu in [4] 
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In this example we have assumed that criticality obtains integer values within the 
range 1-5, where 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4 = high, 5 = very high. 
However, the range of acceptable values can change and it depends on each 
developer. For example, developers might decide it is better for them to assign values 
within the range 1-20. This will provide them with more accurate ratings of the 
criticalities. 
In addition, a maximum value of criticality is defined for each actor taking into 
account, the actor’s abilities, their available time, and the responsibilities they have in 
the organization.  
As mentioned above, security criticality allows us to evaluate how critical each 
actor of the system is with respect to security. Nevertheless, we need to be able to 
evaluate how much effort is required by each of the actors to achieve their security 
constraints. To perform such an evaluation, we introduce the concept of security 
complexity and we identify it as follows:  
 
Security Complexity is the measure of the effort required by the responsible actor 
for achieving a security constraint. 
 
Considering security complexity helps to design sub-systems to support actors that 
might be in danger not achieving some security constraints, and therefore put in 
danger the overall security of the system. This means, if an actor is overloaded with 
security responsibilities, some of the security constraints should be delegated to 
another existing actor of the system, or if this cannot happen, the developer should 
introduce another actor and delegate some of the security constraints of the 
“overloaded” actor. 
In order to be realistic, we need to take into account both the system and security 
complexity, where System Complexity is defined as the measure of the effort required 
from the dependee for achieving the dependum [7]. This is necessary since it might be 
the case that an actor’s security complexity is high, however since their system 
complexity is very low, they are capable of achieving all the security constraints. On 
the other hand, there might be cases where an actor’s security complexity might be 
low but their system complexity is high and therefore they might not be able to 
achieve all the security constraints imposed to them. Thus, by taking into 
consideration both system and security complexity we can identify more precise the 
degree of achievement of the security complexity.  
In addition, an important factor in (realistically) calculating the overall complexity 
is time. It might be the case that an actor can achieve different (secure) goals 
sequentially, so in this case it would not be realistic to sum up the individual values of 
complexity in order to evaluate the overall complexity of the actor.  Sum up all the 
different complexity values would be realistic only if all the goals should achieved at 
the same time. However, in the real world this will be more likely the case of an 
organization (department) in which different agents work, than the case of a single 
agent. 
Similar to criticality analysis, we have assumed that complexity (system and 
security) can obtain integer values within the range 1-5, where 1 = very low, 2= low, 
3=medium, 4=high, 5=very high. Also similarly to criticality, a maximum value of 




Fig. 2. Rationale diagram of the Professional actor 
To be able to precisely assign values for security and system complexity, each actor 
of the system and their security constraints and goals respectively must be further 
analysed. This is necessary because the security constraints and the goals modeled in 
the actors’ diagram (figure 1) are quite superficial and it is difficult to evaluate their 
complexity. Therefore, many different alternative tasks might be considered for their 
satisfaction, each with different complexity value. To cope with this, we are extending 
our analysis, by further analysing (for each actor involved in our system) the security 
constraints (for the security complexity) and the actor’s goals (system complexity), 
together with the different alternatives that can satisfy them. This kind of analysis, 
apart from helping us to define more precisely the values for complexity, it provides a 
basis to choose between different alternatives that can be employed for the 
satisfaction of security constraints and the actor’s goals, something very important in 
justifying the trade offs between security and the functional requirements of the 
system.  
For this analysis, we are employing Tropos rationale diagrams [4]. Differently than 
actors’ diagram, which focuses on the external relationships between the actors of the 
organization, each rationale diagram analyses the internal goals, security constraints 
and dependencies of each actor (figure 2). In order to calculate the values of security 
complexity for each actor, different weights have been assigned to the different 
relationships involved in the satisfaction of the security constraints (secure goals), that 
have been imposed to the actor, and the actor’s strategic goals. For reasons of 
simplicity in this paper we have assumed weights can obtain integer numbers in the 
range of 1-5 (1 being the lowest value with respect to complexity and 5 the highest).   
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In addition, in the cases where the dependum is a soft goal, minimal system 
complexity values are assumed. This is the minimal effort requested from the 
depender to achieve the soft goal. This has been decided since the concept of a soft 
goal has no clear criteria for whether there are satisfied or not, and as such we cannot 
assign a precise value required for achieving the soft goal. 
For our case study, the rationale diagram of the Professional actor is shown in 
figure 2.  As it can be seen from the figure, different alternatives can be considered 
for the satisfaction of the security goals imposed to the actor as well as the actor’s 
strategic goals. For example, to identify problems, the Professional can evaluate info 
manually or use eSAP. For each of those alternatives we have assigned a value as 
shown in figure 2. In addition, the contribution of each alternative to the other 
functional and security requirements is shown in figure 2 (as dashed line links). To 
denote the contributions of the different alternatives, we employ a quantitative 
approach presented by Giorgini et al [8]. Thus each contribution receives weights 
between 0 and 1, where 0 means the alternative puts in maximum danger the security 
or the functional requirement, while 1 means the alternative completely satisfies the 
security or the functional requirement. To keep the diagram simple and 
understandable we denote contributions to the Keep Patient Anonymity security 
constraint, only from the Obtain OP Consent secure goal alternatives (figure 2). 
For example, the Share Information Only if Consents Obtained security constraint 
of the Professional actor is satisfied by the Obtain OP Consent secure goal. However, 
this goal can be achieved by considering different alternatives, each one of those 
alternatives having a different security complexity weight. Thus, the Professional can 
Visit OP, Use Phone, Use eSAP, or Ask a Nurse to obtain the consent of the Older 
Person.  These tasks have been assigned with different weights of complexity 
according to how much effort is required from the Professional to achieve them. Thus, 
in the above-mentioned tasks we have assign weights of 5,4,3 and 2 respectively. 
However, in deciding which task is best suited, developers should also consider how 
this task affects (if it affects) other requirements of the system. For example, although 
the Ask a Nurse is the less complex task for the Professional and the obvious choice 
from the point of view of complexity, it is worth considering that the involvement of a 
nurse could contribute negatively to the Keep Patient Anonymity security constraint 
also imposed to the Professional actor.  This could put in danger the privacy of the 
Older Person, an undesired effect for our system. Thus, we have decided in this case 
to choose the Use eSAP task, since it requires the less effort (apart from the Ask a 
Nurse) and also it helps towards the older person’s privacy. When all the different 
options have been considered and a choice about which one is best suited have been 
made, the next step is to calculate the overall complexity for each actor. This process 
takes part alongside with the calculation of the criticality for each actor. 
In order to analyze the complexity and criticality with respect to security, we firstly 
calculate, for each actor involved, the complexity and the criticality. Then, if some 
actor assumes a greater value of complexity and criticality than the maximum value 
they can assume, we want to reassign some security constraints to different actors of 
the system in order to reduce the complexity or the criticality of the “overloaded” 
actors. In other words, the problem we want to solve is: "how to reassign one (or 
more) goals of actors whose complexity/criticality is greater that their maximum 
complexity/criticality limit?", that is, how can we reconfigure the topology of the 
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actor diagram in order to end up with a “balanced” configuration? Of course we 
would like to solve the problem by means of minimal topology modifications. In fact, 
many solutions may be found by radically redesigning the diagram, but these 
shouldn’t be considered as first choice solutions.  
To take into account these needs, we propose in Figure 3 the Rebalance 
algorithm that, given a representation of an actor diagram and its constraints, is 
capable to produce a new configuration (if it exists), in which the constraints are 
satisfied. For the shake of simplicity, the presented algorithm considers only the 
complexity and not the criticality. However, it is relatively easy to extend the 
algorithm to consider both the complexity and the criticality. 
Let us assume there are m dependums and n actors. Moreover, let us suppose that 
the fact that different actors may fulfill the different dependums, is coded by means of 
a cost matrix CoM[1..n,1..m] where, for each actor i and dependum j, the cost 
for i to fulfill j is CoM[i,j]. This cost may be different for different actors 
fulfilling a given dependum (not all the actors have the same level of skills) and, in 
particular, it may be infinite (MAXINT) for some actors (not all the actors can fulfill a 
given dependum). On the other hand, the vector M_CoV[1..n] provides the 
maximum complexity that each actor can hold. It is worth mentioning that the matrix 
CoM and the vector M_CoV are constant data provided with the analysis of the 
domain. 
In addition, the actor diagram topology, is described by means of a variable 
A[1..n,1..m] of booleans where a “1” in position (i,j) means that the 
dependum j is assigned at the actor i. Of course, for each dependum j there is one 







The core of the algorithm is given by the Function Try_One_Actor that tries to 
rearrange the matrix A in order to accommodate the load of actor i below its 
maximum complexity capacity, starting to analyze dependum j first. It iteratively 
considers possible reassignments for dependum j to other actors that can fulfill it 
without exceeding their maximum capacity. This possibility is tested by the Function: 
 
Fits(A,l,j)=(Compl(l,A)+CoM[l,j] ≤ M_CoV[l]) 
 
The problem is recursively scaled down by considering also other dependums 
(j+1) if the reassignment of the current one (j) is not sufficient or not possible. 
Backtrack is required in case the current reassignment of j to l is useless. 
The above presented core function, considers only one overloaded actor. However, 
it can be extended to consider more overloaded actors (see the Function 
Reballance_Intransitive in Figure 5). Such function is recursively 
called (with possible backtrack) only in the case at least one of the overloaded actors 
can be re-balanced. Backtrack allows us to iteratively consider all the overloaded 
actors in turn as the first to be processed. In fact, the solution may depend, in a 
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generic —even tough very idiosyncratic— case, by the processing order. The 
recursion takes care for considering the other overloaded actors. 
Finally, if a solution involving the redistribution of dependums from actor to actor 
requiring that recipient actors have not to be re-balanced themselves cannot be found 
by means of the Function Reballance_Intransitive (Figure 5), the more 
generic and entry point Function Rebalance try to consider also the possibility of 
transitively affect the load of recipient actors even over their maximum capacity, by 
calling the Function Try_Transitive (Figure 4). In this case the adjustments can 
be spread all over the matrix, implying radical topology redesign. Minimizing 
modifications became now more difficult even to be defined, and, in the current 
version of the algorithm, no particular claim is done, except that termination and the 
production of one solution (if it exists) is guaranteed. Termination is guaranteed by 
the fact that each dependum is reassigned at most once (there is no need to reassign it 
more than once; again, of course, the use of backtracking allow us to test all the re-
assignments). 
 
CONST m:integer; {# of dependums} 
      n:integer; {# of actors} 
      M_CoV:array[1..n] of real;  
      {max cost for each actor} 
      CoM: array[1..n,1..m] od real; 
      {the effort for actor i to provide goal j} 
 
GLOBAL VAR VISITED_DEP: set of visited dependums; 
           {initially empty} 
           A: array[1..n,1..m] of boolean;  
           {the assignament matrix properly 
            initialized to reflect diagram 
            topology} 
 
LOCAL VAR SET_OF_UNBALLANCED: set of actors; 
 
Function Rebalance(var A: ass_matrix): boolean; 
begin 
   result:=Reballance_Intransitive(A); 
   if result=fail then 
   begin 
      SET_OF_UNBALLANCED:={i|Compl(i,A)>M_CoV[i]}; 
      copy_of_A:=A;  
      while result=fail   and  
            not empty(SET_OF_UNBALLANCED)  do 
      begin 
  i:=POP(SET_OF_UNBALLANCED); 
  result:=Try_Transitive(i,A); 
  if result=fail then A:=copy_of_A 
      end 
   end; 
   RETURN result 
end; 
Fig. 3. The reassignment algorithm 
 
Function Try_One_Actor(i,j: integer; var A: ass_matrix):boolean; 
begin 
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   if j>m then RETURN fail; 
   result:=fail; 
   l:=0; 
   if A[i,j]=1 then 
      while Compl(A,i)>M_CoV[i] and l<n do 
      begin 
  l++; 
        if l<>i and Fits(A,l,j) then 
  begin 
     copy_of_A:=A;   
     A[l,j]:=1; A[i,j]:=0; 
     if Compl(A,i)>M_CoV[i] then 
     begin 
        result:=Try_One_Actor(i,j+1,A); 
        if result=fail then A:=copy_of_A 
     end 
     else result:=OK 
  end 
      end; 
   if result=OK then RETURN result 
     else RETURN Try_One_Actor(i,j+1,A) 
end; 
 
Function Try_Transitive(i: integer; var A:ass_matrix):boolean; 
begin 
   result:=fail; 
   copy_of_A:=A; 
   j:=0; 
   if not empty(VISITED_DEP) then 
      while j<m and result=fail do 
      begin 
  j++; 
  if A[i,j]=1 and not j in VISITED_DEP then 
  begin 
     push(j,VISITED_DEP); 
     l:=0; 
     while l<n and  
                 (Compl(i,A)>M_CoV[i] or 
                  result=fail)             do 
     begin 
        l++; 
        if l<>i and CoM[l,j]<MAXINT then 
        begin 
    A[l,j]:=1; A[i,j]:=0;           
result:=Reballance(A); 
    if result=fail then A:=copy_of_A  
        end 
     end; 
     if result=fail then VISITED_DEP:=VISITED_DEP-{j} 
  end 
      end; 
   RETURN result 
End 
Fig. 4. The functions Try_One_Actor and Try_Transitive 
 
Function Reballance_Intransitive (var A:ass_matrix):boolean; 
begin 
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   result:=fail; 
   SET_OF_UNBALLANCED:={i|Compl(i,A)>M_CoV[i]}; 
   if empty(SET_OF_UNBALLANCED) then result:=OK 
   else 
   begin 
      copy_of_A:=A;  
      while result=fail and  
            not empty(SET_OF_UNBALLANCED) do 
      begin 
  i:=POP(SET_OF_UNBALLANCED); 
  if Try_One_Actor(i,1,A)=OK then 
  begin  
     result:=Reballance_Intransitive(A); 
     if result=fail then A:=copy_of_A 
  end 
      end 
   end; 
   RETURN result 
end; 
Fig. 5. The function Reballance_Intransitive 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented an analysis for evaluating the degree of complexity 
and criticality of the actors of the system, with respect to security. Such an analysis 
provides a valuable process for the developers of multi-agent systems in order to 
identify possible security bottlenecks. In addition, we have proposed an algorithm to 
reduce the complexity or the criticality of the “overloaded” actors.  
Our analysis helps to justify possible trade offs between security and functional 
requirements. By knowing how critical an agent is with respect to security a decision 
can be made. Our aim is to provide a clear well guided process of integrating security 
and functional requirements throughout the whole range of the development stages. 
Such a process must use the same concepts and notations throughout the development 
phases. The ability to identify the bottlenecks of a multi-agent system with respect to 
security and justify the decisions behind possible trade offs between security and 
functional requirements can definitely help towards this aim. 
It is worth mentioning that in this paper we only consider security requirements. 
Nevertheless, our approach can be easily adapted to deal with other non-functional 
requirements. 
This work is an ongoing research. The presented analysis covers only the 
requirements stage of the Tropos methodology. We are working towards extending 
our analysis to the next stages of the methodology, since such an analysis can help in 
the later stages of the development. For example, criticality and complexity can help 
us to decide for different architectural choices during the architectural design stage of 
the methodology, such as the choice between mobile and static agents.  
In addition, we are working towards the development of a process that will allow 
developers to assign weights to different alternatives in case the different stakeholders 
disagree on the assignment.  
13 
The present version of the algorithm guarantees to find a solution that requires the 
reassignments of dependums of overloaded actors only, if it exists. Otherwise, a 
solution with transitive reassignments is in any case provided (if it exists), although 
we cannot at present guarantee it is the best. We believe that, possibly after small 
improvements, the algorithm can provide the “best” solution. We foresee to work to 
prove this fact. Moreover, our future research plan includes also the study of the 
complexity of the algorithm, and its implementation and test.   
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